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CLIENT CONFIDENTIALITY, PROFESSIONAL PRIVILEGE
AND ONLINE COMMUNICATION: POTENTIAL IMPLICATIONS
OF THE BARTON DECISION
Kelcey Nichols1
Abstract
In a recent case of first impression, Barton v. U.S. District
Court for the Central District of California, the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that an online
communication involving an online intake form filled out by
prospective clients gave rise to an attorney-client relationship
governed by the duty of confidentiality and subject to
attorney-client-privilege. The Ninth Circuit’s multi-factored
analysis suggests a modified framework for evaluating when
the duty of confidentiality and attorney-client relationship can
be formed through online communications. This Article
discusses Barton’s implications for attorneys and law firms
that communicate with clients and potential clients online.
Attorneys should be able to avoid an unexpected duty of
confidentiality created through an online communication by
clearly defining the attorney-client relationship and adhering









<1>In a case of first impression, Barton v. U.S. District Court for
the Central District of California, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
1
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Ninth Circuit (“Ninth Circuit”) held that a duty of confidentiality
arose when prospective clients filled out an online questionnaire
posted by a law firm.2  In Barton, a law firm sought potential
clients to participate in a class action suit involving the
prescription drug Paxil. The law firm posted a detailed
questionnaire for potential class members on its website.3
Although the firm’s website included a disclaimer stating that
voluntary completion of the online questionnaire did not initiate an
attorney-client relationship, the court characterized the interaction
as an initial consultation.4  The Ninth Circuit, however, when
viewing the attorney-client relationship from the perspective of a
prospective client, held the online communication did give rise to
a duty of confidentiality based on the attorney’s duties to their
prospective clients.5  When the defendants in the suit sought
disclosure of the online forms, the Ninth Circuit ruled that the
questionnaires were protected under attorney-client privilege.6
<2>The Barton decision may have implications for attorneys who
communicate with clients and potential clients online. In Barton,
the Ninth Circuit considered several factors before determining
that the online communication gave rise to a professional
relationship governed by the duty of confidentiality and subject to
attorney-client-privilege. As online communication with clients
increases, courts will need to determine when the duty of
confidentiality arises online and, subsequently, when attorney-
client privilege attaches. The Ninth Circuit’s analysis provides a
useful framework for addressing the ethical and evidentiary
implications raised by online communications.7  However, the
factors that determine if an attorney-client relationship exists will
depend on the context of each case and who asserts the privilege.
Courts are likely to apply the Barton factors differently in
situations involving a client’s assertion of attorney-client privilege
to prevent an opponent from obtaining information through
discovery as contrasted with cases of attorney malpractice
because of the different nature of each of proceeding.
PROFESSIONAL PRIVILEGE
<3>Online communication between an attorney and a current or
prospective client8  may give rise to a duty of confidentiality.9
Once a lawyer communicates with a prospective client by way of
an initial consultation, the lawyer has a duty of confidentiality,
even if no subsequent client-relationship forms.10  Online
communications with prospective clients can be particularly fraught
with complications because many means of online communication
remain legally undefined. For example, the law has yet to define
what constitutes the unauthorized practice of law with respect to
Internet communications.11 2
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<4>Most states have adopted some form of the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct that govern attorney conduct. Accordingly,
lawyers have generally used state law governing professional
conduct and the Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing
Lawyers to advise their online communications with clients and
prospective clients.12  However, not all of these rules are readily
adaptable to the Internet, where there are no readily apparent
jurisdictional boundaries.13  Furthermore, prospective clients and
attorneys may expect different things from online
communication.14  These expectations play a crucial role in
determining when a communication gives rise to an attorney’s
duty to protect a prospective client’s confidentiality.15
<5>Client confidences protected by rules of professional conduct
may also be protected under attorney-client privilege and
therefore inadmissible as evidence.16  In general, the professional
duty of confidentiality is broader than the evidentiary protection
under attorney-client privilege.17  Because privilege results in
withholding information from the fact-finder, courts construe
privilege narrowly.18  The proponent of the privilege has the
burden of proving that the privilege exists.19  An existing privilege
may be waived either by voluntary disclosure to people outside, or
not essential to, the attorney-client relationship, or by failing to
take reasonable measures to protect confidentiality.20  The
opponent of the privilege has the burden of showing waiver.21
<6>Online communications raise distinct issues regarding waiver.
First, online communications may be less secure than a face-to-
face meeting or written correspondence.22  In addition, boilerplate
disclaimers used online by attorneys may be insufficient to
adequately inform prospective clients about a potential waiver of
confidentiality and secure the necessary consent.23  Furthermore,
in determining whether an attorney has a duty of confidentiality to
a client or a prospective client, courts consider the client, rather
than the attorney’s, expectations.24  The client’s belief that an
attorney-client relationship exists must be reasonable.25
THE BARTON DECISION
<7>In Barton, a law firm posted an online questionnaire on its
website in order to identify potential members of a class
comprised of persons who had experienced adverse effects after
ceasing to take the drug Paxil.26  During discovery, the
manufacturer of Paxil sought disclosure of four of the plaintiffs’
questionnaires: the plaintiffs argued that the questionnaires were
protected by attorney-client privilege.27  However, the plaintiffs’ 3
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attorneys also tried to use the online questionnaire’s disclaimer to
protect themselves from liability arising under the attorney-client
relationship.28  The U.S. District Court for the Central District of
California concluded that the plaintiffs’ attorneys could not have it
both ways and found in favor of the defendants.29  The district
court therefore declined to protect the allegedly privileged
information.30
<8>The plaintiffs appealed to the Ninth Circuit and sought a writ of
mandamus because the defendants’ exposure to the information
the plaintiffs sought to protect could not be undone.31  In deciding
whether to grant the writ of mandamus,32  the Ninth Circuit
evaluated the online contact from the prospective clients. The
Ninth Circuit weighed several factors in determining whether the
questionnaires were confidential and protected by attorney-client
privilege, granted the plaintiffs’ writ of mandamus and vacated the
District Court’s decision.33
<9>In finding that the online questionnaire gave rise to a duty of
confidentiality, the Ninth Circuit outlined several reasons why the
online questionnaire served as an initial contact between the
potential client and attorney.34  First, the law firm used the form
to gather “information about potential class members.”35
Although the online questionnaire expressly stated that no
attorney-client relationship had been formed, the law firm referred
to the form as an “intake” questionnaire in its briefs, implying that
the form resembled an initial meeting with a prospective client.36
Furthermore, the disclaimer regarding the attorney-client
relationship did not disclaim confidentiality.37  Second, four of the
plaintiffs secured legal representation by filling out the online
form.38  Third, some of the people who filled out the online
questionnaire did so in order to “get in on the class action.”39
Fourth, the court considered the level of inquiry of the
questionnaires, including the request for detailed information
about psychological and physical symptoms.40
<10>The court further identified several factors weighing against
confidentiality and the protection of the attorney-client privilege,
including: 1) the ambiguous wording of the online questionnaire;
2) the law firm’s disclaimer; 3) the response of one participant
who did not think the questionnaire formed an attorney-client
relationship; 4) an acknowledgement by the person who had filled
out the form that he/she was not requesting legal advice; and 5)
the law firm’s statement about gathering information about
potential class action members rather than soliciting clients.41
<11>The Ninth Circuit concluded, however, that “more important
than what the law firm intended is what the clients thought.”42  In 4
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contrast to the district court, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the
duty of confidentiality did attach through the initial online contact
between the law firm and prospective clients. The Ninth Circuit
held that attorney-client privilege protected from discovery the
information submitted by the prospective clients.43
<12>The court construed the ambiguity surrounding the formation
of the attorney-client relationship against the law firm, holding
that the online questionnaire did not constitute a “disclaimer of
confidentiality” because the questionnaire failed to address
confidentiality.44  As a result of the questionnaire’s silence on
confidentiality, the court found that the law firm’s online
questionnaire gave rise to a professional duty of confidentiality
that allowed the clients to subsequently assert attorney-client
privilege. The court also weighed the ambiguity of the online
intake form and held that the plaintiffs should not be penalized for
the law firm’s lack of clarity in drafting the form. The court left
open the possibility that a less ambiguous form and clear waiver
of confidentiality could avoid the creation of an attorney-client
relationship.
IMPLICATIONS OF THE BARTON DECISION
<13>The Barton decision will have a significant impact on the
professional duty of confidentiality and subsequent assertion of
attorney-client privilege originating from online communication.
Attorneys and law firms in a diverse array of practice areas use
the Internet as a communication tool, regardless of whether they
provide advice over the Internet. 45  Attorneys may use the
Internet to find class action litigants, as the firm in Barton did, or
to provide intake forms for prospective clients.46  As more
attorneys offer an online component to their services, courts will
need to establish how to apply the Rules of Professional Conduct
to online communications, determine when such communications
give rise to the duty of confidentiality and when attorney-client
privilege protects online communications.
<14>While some states have expanded their laws regarding online
practice, many ethical issues remain unaddressed.47  Both the
Model Rules of Professional Conduct and some state ethics
commissions have become more accepting of online
communications between attorneys and potential clients. For
example, several jurisdiction view email communications as no
more likely to breach client confidentiality than letters, faxes and
landline telephones.48  In addition, the Texas State Bar committee
recently decided that an attorney may participate in an online
service that matches prospective clients with attorneys as long as
the online service does not operate as a private referral service.49
5
Nichols: Client Confidentiality, Professional Privilege and Online Communi
Published by UW Law Digital Commons, 2007
Client Confidentiality, Professional Privilege and Online Communication >> Shidler Journal of Law, Commerce & Technology
http://www.lctjournal.washington.edu/Vol3/a010Nichols.html[3/23/2010 10:48:36 AM]
<15>Neither state law nor the Model Rules of Professional Conduct
address the potential for a breach of confidentiality through an
online form. Hackers who attempt to illegally intercept information
transmitted between computers may threaten online
communications.50  While federal laws now impose civil and
criminal penalties for intercepting electronic information without
authorization, as with mail fraud, the risk still remains palpable.51
<16>Nonetheless, Barton helps define when an online
communication between an attorney and a prospective client
seeking legal advice will likely give rise to a duty of confidentiality
by applying the existing ethical rules to Internet-related
communications.52  Barton illustrates that an initial online contact
with a prospective client, like an initial meeting in a law office,
may be seen as an initial consultation.53  As with an initial face-
to-face meeting with a prospective client, an attorney may need
to screen for conflicts when initiating online communication with a
prospective client.54  However, a unilateral unsolicited contact
from a prospective client to an attorney may not give rise to a
duty of confidentiality, even if the prospective client discloses
confidential information.55  Clearly defining the attorney-client
relationship with regard to online communication plays a critical
role in protecting attorney-client privilege and avoiding
professional liability.56
<17>However, absent state or federal laws that define when an
online communication between an attorney and prospective gives
rise to a duty of confidentiality, courts and ethics committees will
likely decide whether the duty exists based on the particular facts
of each case.57  In Barton, the court focused on the clients’ rights
and found the law firm’s disclaimer vague and ambiguous.58  The
court then construed this ambiguous language in favor of the
persons who completed the questionnaires and held that the
vague nature of the disclaimer precluded a determination that
those persons had waived the confidentiality of their responses.59
The fact that the questionnaire-takers later became clients of the
law firm also played a role in the court’s determination.
<18>In the wake of Barton, courts may hold that confidential
information communicated to an attorney online constitutes strong
evidence of a prospective client’s intent to form a professional
relationship.60  In addition, the overall context of the online
communication, which the Ninth Circuit emphasized in Barton,
may determine whether the communication qualifies as a request
for legal services.61  If an attorney gives advice over the Internet,
courts may weigh the specificity of that advice in determining
whether an attorney-client relationship has formed.62  An attorney
who gives advice over the Internet may also be liable for the 6
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unauthorized practice of law if that attorney gives advice to a
client in different jurisdiction.63
<19>The formation of an attorney-client relationship also requires
that a lawyer “manifests consent” to represent a client or that,
absent express consent, the lawyer “knows or reasonably should
have known” the client is relying on the lawyer to provide legal
services.64  Attorneys need to be aware of the fact that
prospective clients using the Internet for legal services may have
different expectations of the attorney’s role and obligations.65  As
seen in Barton, courts are likely to give the benefit of the doubt
to prospective clients rather than attorneys. Coupled with courts’
narrow construction of privilege in general,66  Barton should alert
attorneys that the responsibility of defining the attorney-client
relationship falls on lawyers. Although the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct explicitly states that an attorney does not
have a duty of confidentiality to people who communicate
“unilaterally” with the attorney, 67  online communications appear
to give rise to a gray area where attorneys and prospective
clients’ expectations do not match.
<20>Barton left open the possibility that a clear disclaimer, written
in “plain English,”68  may avoid the formation of an attorney-
client relationship.69  The law firm’s disclaimer in Barton did not
specify whether respondents’ answers would be confidential.70  In
addition, the disclaimer failed because of the attorneys’
subsequent actions and representation of persons who had
completed the relevant questionnaires. Accordingly, courts will
likely consider the overall circumstances surrounding the
disclaimer. If attorneys’ actions are inconsistent with the
disclaimer, courts are unlikely to uphold the waiver given the
general construction against the attorney.71
<21>In Barton, the disclaimer failed both because of the
ambiguous language, failure to address confidentiality and the law
firm’s subsequent actions in asserting attorney-client privilege.72
In contrast, a court may uphold a disclaimer that is clear from the
client’s perspective if the attorney’s actions are in keeping with
the disclaimer. For example, an attorney, who uses a clear
disclaimer online and does not pursue representation, may
prevent the formation of attorney-client relationship. To avoid
ambiguity, attorneys should use a follow-up communication that
clarifies that the attorney has declined representation.73  A
successful disclaimer of the attorney-client relationship should not
be confused with a waiver of confidentiality.
CONCLUSION
7
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<22>Barton illustrates that even online communications that do not
involve attorneys giving advice are subject to the standards of
professional conduct. A person’s online communication with an
attorney may give rise to a duty of confidentiality. Accordingly,
that communication may be subsequently protected by attorney-
client privilege. While Internet lawyering has often been
characterized in terms of online chatrooms and bulletin boards,74
traditional law firms, such as the one in Barton, will likely confront
issues of professional responsibility as they use the Internet to
reach out to prospective clients.
PRACTICE POINTERS
Online communications with prospective clients should
clearly define the professional relationship from the
client’s point of view.
Online communications should clearly set forth the
duty of confidentiality and any waiver of confidentiality
from the potential client’s point of view.
Attorneys should be wary of online communications
that would lead them to practice in a state where they
are not licensed.
When advertising online, attorneys should strictly
follow the rules of professional conduct, keeping in
mind that courts have not yet fully defined the
parameters of acceptable online advertising.
Attorneys should be conservative in their online
communications given courts’ general construction
against the attorney.
Attorneys should monitor the development of the law
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